(This is a duplicate of what I just posted to my Weblog, because
yonmei and
brisingamen have had discussions of this in their journals)
Bruce Schneier explains why
fingerprinting visitors to the US will not make us safe.
Bruce Schneier explains why
fingerprinting visitors to the US will not make us safe.
Security is a trade-off. When deciding whether to implement a security measure, we must balance the costs against the benefits. Large-scale fingerprinting is something that doesn't add much to our security against terrorism and costs an enormous amount of money that could be better spent elsewhere. Allocating the funds on compiling, sharing and enforcing the terrorist watch list would be a far better security investment. As a security consumer, I'm getting swindled....It's bad civic hygiene to build an infrastructure that can be used to facilitate a police state.
From:
no subject
Of course, as far as I know the visas of the 9-11 were legit.
From:
no subject
No country in the world does biometric passports right now, so the US is still letting people from the 28 countries on the visa waiver scheme in without being fingerprinted, unless they had to get a new passport after October 2004, because that's the biometric passport deadline.
A new passport after October 2004, or any visa at all, means (in the UK) a visit to the US Embassy in London, which is warranted to take up half a day (let alone the time/cost of getting there and back for those of us who live outside the SE of England - which is most of us) and will cost £67. ($122.68 in US money) That is actually more than the airport tax costs of a ticket to the US... plus the fact that all travellers who do this end up on a ginormous database the ultimate purpose of which is not in the least clear, and the information on which is not guaranteed by the Data Protection Act.
From:
no subject
If they're not reliable, I hope I won't be disappeared into the anti-terrorist camps...